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The European Union is expanding. It will be 
profoundly changed by enlargement, but must 
not be weakened by it. 
The number of Member States could almost 
double in the foreseeable future. The idea of 
an initial enlargement producing a union of 
20 Member States, on which the results of 
the previous intergovernmental conference 
were based, has been overtaken by events. 
13 candidate countries are now engaged in 
the enlargement process. 
The challenge of this process is to extend to 
our European neighbours the benefits of 
peace, solidarity and economic growth, which 
we currently enjoy, by welcoming them into 
an appropriate institutional framework. This 
will be the key to the success of the European 
venture. 
The simple but fundamental question is how 
the Union is to operate effectively when it 
has 20, 25 or even 30 members. How can the 
institutions continue to perform the tasks con-
ferred upon them by the Treaties? How, more 
fundamentally, will the Union maintain its 
decision-making capacity and its cohesion so 
that the process of furthering European inte-
gration can continue? 
Today, the institutional framework is showing 
its limits and presents certain anomalies. It is 
not understandable to the European citizens. 
Because an enlarged Union risks becoming 
weaker and less coherent it makes it imperative 
to re-examine, in depth, the composition of its 
institutions and bodies and modify the way they 
operate. The forthcoming conference will be 
the last opportunity for the European Union 
to cure these weaknesses and prepare the insti-
tutions for the forthcoming enlargement. 
At its meeting in Cologne on 3 and 4 June 
1999, the European Council confirmed 'its 
intention of convening a conference of the 
representatives of the governments of the 
Member States early in 2000 to resolve the 
institutional issues left open in Amsterdam 
that need to be settled before enlargement' 
and called on the Presidency to draw up a 
report for the Helsinki European Council. 
In the light of the Finnish Presidency's report 
('Effective institutions following enlargement 
— suggestions for the intergovernmental con-
ference'), produced after consultation with 
the Member States, the European Parliament 
and the Commission ('), the Helsinki Eur-
opean Council decided on 10 December 1999 
that the intergovernmental conference would 
be convened in February 2000. 
The conference will examine 'the size and com-
position of the Commission, the weighting of 
votes in the Council ..., as well as other neces-
sary amendments to the Treaties arising as 
regards the European institutions in connection 
with the above issues and in implementing the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. The incoming Presidency 
will report to the European Council on progress 
made in the conference and may propose addi-
tional issues to be taken on the agenda of the 
conference.'' 
In accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Council asked the Eur-
opean Parliament and the Commission, on 
17 December 1999, for an opinion on the con-
vening of a conference of representatives of the 
governments of the Member States with a view 
to amending the Treaties. 
In this document, which constitutes the Com-
mission's opinion, the Commission expresses 
its support for the convening of an intergo-
vernmental conference to amend the Treaties. 
This opinion has been produced following the 
guidelines laid down by the Commission in the 
contribution it approved on 10 November 
1999 for the Helsinki European Council. It will 
serve as the basis for the positions to be taken 
by the Commission representatives during the 
conference. 
The conference is scheduled to last 11 months. 
This opinion submits to the conference draft 
amendments to articles of the Treaty, in cer-
tain areas, when it was possible to take 
(') 'Adapting the institutions to make a success of enlarge-
ment' — contribution to preparations for the intergovern-
mental conference, communication from the Commission 
presented on 10 November 1999 (COM(99) 592). 
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account of the progress of reflection. The 
Commission will, in due course, present other 
contributions to expand on some of the propo­
sals contained in this opinion. In its concern 
that the conference should bring about a thor­
ough reform of the European institutions, the 
Commission undertakes to lend its full support 
to the Council Presidencies, which will be 
responsible for directing the proceedings. 
* * * 
The Helsinki European Council asked the Por­
tuguese Presidency to report to the European 
Council on the progress made in the confer­
ence. It may suggest additional issues to be 
put on the conference agenda. 
The Commission notes that in the course of 
2000 the European Council will, in any case, 
have to decide on the possible inclusion of a 
number of issues. Two matters, in particular, 
require consideration: 
D as specified in the conclusions of the 
Cologne European Council, a body was cre­
ated to draft a charter of fundamental rights 
for the European Union. No decision has yet 
been taken on whether this charter could be 
incorporated into the Treaties and, if so, how; 
□ the Helsinki European Council adopted 
two reports by the Presidency on developing 
the Union's military and non­military crisis 
management capability as part of a strength­
ened common European policy on security 
and defence. The Portuguese Presidency has 
been asked to present an overall report to the 
Feira European Council containing appropri­
ate recommendations and proposals and an 
indication as to whether or not amendments 
are needed to the Treaties. 
The Commission also sees considerable merit 
in the proposal that the Treaties be divided into 
two separate parts (the basic texts and the 
implementing texts of less fundamental impor­
tance) (')· The Treaty texts would become sim­
pler and more readable, something which is 
widely felt to be necessary. Such a distinction 
would also make it possible to introduce a less 
cumbersome mechanism for amending the 
implementing instruments than that currently 
in place for Treaty revisions and one better 
suited to the prospect of a doubling of the 
number of Member States. The Commission 
has decided to examine the feasibility of recast­
ing the Treaties along these lines and has asked 
the European University Institute in Florence 
to study the question. Depending on the 
results of this study, the Commission reserves 
the right to present proposals on this matter 
to the conference. 
(') The Commission stressed in its opinion for the previous 
intergovernmental conference the need to make a distinc­
tion between provisions of a genuinely fundamental nature 
and those which are not, so that the latter could be 
amended 'by a procedure which imposes fewer constraints 
than the one currently in force'. The proposal was devel­
oped in the report by Jean­Luc Dehaene, Richard von 
Weizsäcker and David Simon ('The institutional implica­
tions of enlargement' — presented to the European Com­
mission on 18 October 1999). 
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Chapter 1 — Role, operation and 
composition of the institutions and 
bodies of the European Union 
1. Introduction 
The composition of an institution is, or should 
be, no more than the logical consequence of an 
analysis of the role it plays within the Union 
and the need to ensure its effective operation. 
The role of each institution is clearly defined in 
the Treaties. There is a consensus to the effect 
that the purpose of the conference is not to 
alter the functions and powers of the institu-
tions: the current institutional balance must 
be maintained. In any case, the Commission 
believes that the conference should undertake 
general thinking on the democratic legitimacy 
of the European system, and in particular, on 
the nature of its executive so it must be assured 
that the amendments that the conference 
approves respond without ambiguity to a 
major démocratisation of the institutional fra-
mework of the Union. 
Moreover, enlargement requires changes in the 
way in which the institutions operate to ensure 
their effectiveness in a Union whose member-
ship is set to double. The Treaties govern only 
the basic principles of the operation of the 
institutions. It is up to each institution to carry 
out the necessary internal reforms itself Some 
have already embarked on this process of 
modifying their structures and working meth-
ods. In addition to these changes, the confer-
ence will have to examine the extent to which 
Treaty amendments will be needed to complete 
the reform process. 
The composition of the various institutions 
should be determined solely as a function of 
their role and the way they operate. 
The present opinion is based on the perspec-
tive of enlargement of the European Union 
to all the candidate States. It could be that 
all will not join at the same time and that the 
conference will have to define, depending on 
the timetable of accession, the appropriate 
arrangements and eventual transitional provi-
sions for the composition of the institutions 
and organs of the Union in the interim period. 
The timing could, for example, be the subject 
of declarations annexed to the Treaty which 
were drawn up by the conference. 
2. The European Parliament 
The European Parliament is the institution 
representing the peoples of the States, which 
together form the Community. Its role follows 
from the duties conferred upon it by the Trea-
ties. The Treaty establishing the European 
Community designates it as co-legislator in 
many areas of activity. In other areas, Parlia-
ment is required to give its assent or deliver 
advisory opinions. Together with the Council, 
it constitutes the budgetary authority. It exer-
cises political control over the Commission. 
The conference is not seeking to alter the role 
or powers of the institutions. However, the 
Commission believes that where legislative 
decisions are concerned, a link should be 
established between qualified-majority voting 
and the co-decision procedure. This applies 
both to legislative decisions in areas currently 
subject to qualified-majority voting and to 
any future extension. The consequence of this 
approach would be to strengthen Parliament's 
role as co-legislator. This question will be dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 2, Section 3 
of this opinion. 
In regard to the operation of the European 
Parliament, the Commission believes this can 
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be adapted to enlargement without any 
amendment of the Treaties, by alterations to 
its rules of procedure, to be introduced by Par-
liament itself. However, the regulations and 
general conditions governing the performance 
of the duties of the Members of the European 
Parliament should be established as a matter 
of urgency, in accordance with Article 190(5) 
of the EC Treaty. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam has already partly 
settled the question of the composition of the 
European Parliament by stipulating explicitly 
in Article 189 of the EC Treaty that: 'the num-
ber of Members of the European Parliament 
shall not exceed 700'. This figure, which was 
proposed by Parliament itself, satisfies two 
requirements: it ensures due representation of 
the people, while restricting the institution to 
a size compatible with the effective exercise 
of its duties. The Commission proposes that this 
figure be retained. 
Article 190(2) of the EC Treaty specifies the 
number of members of the European Parlia-
ment currently returned by each Member 
State. There are 626 members in all. If the 
number of members returned by new Member 
States were to be determined according to the 
system used to date, the upper limit of 700 
members would probably be exceeded in the 
first wave of accessions. The system will there-
fore have to be re-examined, as anticipated by 
Parliament's resolution of 10 June 1992 ('), if 
the limit of 700 members is to be respected. 
The Commission believes that it is for Parlia-
ment to propose new arrangements for allocat-
ing seats. The Commission offers the following 
ideas. 
While complying with the limit of 700 mem-
bers, a minimum level of representation of 
the population of each Member State must 
be ensured. 
The current composition of the European Par-
liament was agreed by the Edinburgh Eur-
opean Council on 11 and 12 December 1992, 
on the basis of a Parliament proposal taking 
into account the unification of Germany and 
looking ahead to the accession of certain 
EFTA countries. The European Parliament 
proposal was based on a principle of digressive 
proportionality (2). The same formula was 
used to determine the number of members to 
represent Austria, Finland and Sweden, 
although a slight modification was made to 
the number that would have resulted from 
the strict application of the formula. 
This formula must now be re-examined: 
D in theory, seats might be allocated among 
the Member States on a strictly proportional 
basis according to population. However, the 
Commission feels that this is not a realistic 
option at this stage of political integration of 
the Union; 
D one option would be to produce a revised 
version of the formula on which the 1992 deci-
sion was based, maintaining the principle of 
digressive proportionality but starting from a 
lower minimum number of members and allo-
cating fewer seats per capita and/or altering 
the population bands. It is important to 
remember, however, that the digressive pro-
portionality element would reduce the parlia-
mentary representation of the most populous 
Member States even more than in the past, 
because the formula, even after modification, 
will continue to benefit the other countries, 
particularly those with a medium-sized popu-
lation; 
D another option would be a linear reduction 
in the number of seats allocated by the for-
mula used until now. The enlargement process 
would then have the same relative impact on 
the distribution of the number of members. 
The factor for the reduction would have to 
be calculated on each new accession, as a func-
tion of the ratio of the 700-member limit to the 
theoretical total number of members that 
would result from application of the current 
formula for both current Member States and 
the accession countries. 
Finally, the Commission believes that the 
Union would greatly benefit from having a num-
ber of members of the European Parliament 
elected on European lists, presented to all Eur-
(') De Gucht report 
13.7.1992, p. 72. 
Resolution A3-0186/92, OJ C 176, 
(2) The allocation of seats by Member State proposed by the 
European Parliament was based on the following formula: 
6 seats to be allocated to each Member State regardless of 
population, plus an additional seat per 500 000 inhabitants 
for the number of inhabitants between 1 and 25 million, an 
additional seat per million inhabitants for the number of 
inhabitants between 25 and 60 million, and an additional 
seat for every 2 million inhabitants above 60 million. How-
ever, this formula has not been strictly applied. 
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opean voters throughout the Union. The voters 
would then have to vote twice: once on a 
national list and once for the group of mem­
bers on these European lists. The number of 
members to be elected on the national list 
would then be calculated after deducting a 
proportional number of seats required to con­
stitute the 'European' contingent. 
Organising the European elections in this way 
would encourage the development of Europe­
wide political parties and produce members 
who could claim to represent a European con­
stituency rather than a purely national one. 
The provisions of the Treaty relating to Eur­
opean political parties require practical appli­
cation. 
Commission proposals to the conference: 
■ the upper limit of 700 for Members of the European Parliament should be retained; 
■ the European Parliament should be asked to work out a method of allocating members 
among the Member States that takes account of this upper limit; 
■ consideration should be given to the possibility of electing a number of members on 
Union­wide lists. 
3. The Council 
The Council is the institution in which the gov­
ernments of the Member States making up the 
Union are represented. 
From the outset, the Council has been the 
Community legislator. With the Treaties of 
Maastricht and Amsterdam, this is a role it 
came to share with the European Parliament. 
It is the most important institution in deter­
mining and implementing the common foreign 
and security policy and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. The Council, 
together with the European Parliament, is the 
budgetary authority. 
The Council has a representative from every 
Member State. The new wording in the Maas­
tricht Treaty of the provision in question (the 
present Article 203 of the EC Treaty), in other 
words, that the Council shall be made up of 'a 
representative of each Member State at minis­
terial level, authorised to commit the govern­
ment ofthat Member State', also allows indivi­
dual Member States, however organised, to 
meet the requirements of its internal constitu­
tional requirements. Enlargement poses, how­
ever, important difficulties for the functioning 
of the Council and will require substantial 
changes for dealing with a series of concrete 
questions. 
The Council has carried out a detailed exami­
nation of its operation in the context of enlar­
gement, based on a report tabled by the 
Secretary­General of the Council in March 
1999. At its meeting in Helsinki (9 and 
10 December 1999), the European Council 
approved a number of these recommenda­
tions, which do not require any amendment 
of the Treaties. However, it is quite possible 
that the conference might discuss more radi­
cal changes, which will require changes to the 
Treaties. 
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4. The Commission 
(a) The Commission's role 
and operation 
The European Commission is without doubt 
the most original component of the institu-
tional framework set up by the Treaties. 
No other international organisation or 
arrangement of cooperation between counties 
has an institution like it. It is not an intergo-
vernmental structure, yet it is not an elected 
body either. It was set up to defend European 
interest on a fully independent basis. It is col-
lectively accountable to the European Parlia-
ment. 
On this last point it should be borne in mind 
that the Treaty of Amsterdam entrusted the 
President with the task of exercising political 
guidance over the work of the Commission; 
the Members of the Commission are chosen 
by common accord with the nominee for Pre-
sident. These new responsibilities of the Presi-
dent were reflected in the political undertaking 
given by the Members of the present Commis-
sion to resign if asked to do so by the President. 
The Commission proposes that this undertaking 
be formally incorporated in the Treaty in order 
to reinforce the collective political accountabil-
ity of the Commission. 
Under the Treaties, the Commission has a 
variety of different roles. It is the driving force 
behind European integration, since it alone has 
the right to initiate Community legislation. It 
is the 'guardian of the Treaties'. The Commis-
sion is the Community's executive, taking 
enforcement action, implementing the budget 
and managing Community policies and pro-
grammes. It acts as the Community's represen-
tative and speaks on the Community's behalf 
in international negotiations. 
The Commission operates according to the 
principle of collective responsibility, which 
means that, regardless of the Member State 
of which they are nationals, all Members of 
the Commission play an equal part in the pre-
paration of proposals and the taking of deci-
sions. All Commission Members then bear col-
lective responsibility for these decisions. 
Managing collective responsibility within a 20-
member Commission already slows proceed-
ings down in certain respects (as in the Coun-
cil, discussions often involve going round the 
table so that all the Members can have their 
say) and makes for a heavy administrative 
workload. The Commission takes thousands 
of decisions a year, some 200 or so each week. 
The Commission is currently undertaking 
important reforms to its organisation. These 
will provide, through a modernisation of its 
working methods and the procedure, for main-
taining real collective decision-making, while 
providing for a broader use of habilitation in 
defined areas under conditions fixed by the 
Commission. Such reform should be already 
considered, independently of the future com-
position of the Commission. Such reform will 
be necessary when the present number of 
Commissioners increases. 
Collective responsibility is, in effect, what 
essentially gives Commission decisions their 
legitimacy, since, the Commission, although 
it is politically responsible before the Eur-
opean Parliament, is not an elected body, 
which is different from other types of execu-
tives. 
In the enlarged Union, the Commission's task of 
maintaining coherence and unity will be more 
difficult, but at the same time more necessary 
as its capacity for action must be safeguarded. 
(b) The composition of the 
Commission 
From the outset, the Commission was 
designed as an institution to safeguard the col-
lective interest and this is how it continues to 
operate. This is why, far from giving Commis-
sioners the status of national government 
representatives, which is the job of the Mem-
bers of the Council, the Treaty actually stipu-
lates that Members of the Commission must 
'in the general interest of the Community, be 
completely independent in the performance 
of their duties' and may 'neither seek nor take 
instructions from any government' (Article 
213(2) of the EC Treaty). 
The number of Commissioners has a direct 
bearing on the Commission's ability to operate 
as a collective body. Article 213 of the EC 
Treaty states the following: 'The Commission 
must include at least one national of each of 
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the Member States, but may not include more 
than two Members having the nationality of 
the same State.' From the very beginning, the 
Commission has always been made up of two 
Members from each of the larger Member 
States and one Member from each of the other 
Member States. 
After the 13 countries currently applying for 
membership have joined, the existing system 
would produce a Commission with 35 members, 
which is almost four times as many as when it 
was first set up. 
The Commission believes, however, that the 
key issue is deciding whether in the future 
the Commission will have to be made up of 
one national from each Member State, regard-
less of the number of Member States, or 
whether there are good reasons for opting for 
an alternative solution. 
The Commission is of the view that this issue 
needs to be looked at afresh, since the forth-
coming enlargement is not just about adding 
four or five countries, but involves virtually 
doubling the number of Member States. The 
issue must be addressed and resolved now, as 
there is little likelihood of subsequently 
departing from whatever solution is agreed 
on at the next intergovernmental conference, 
even if the solution is put forward as provi-
sional. 
If there are to be fewer Commissioners than 
Member States, the arrangements for appoint-
ing them now need to be worked out. 
If the Commission is to be made up of a national 
from each Member State regardless of the 
number of Member States, then the issue to 
be addressed is the Commission's ability to 
operate effectively with 28 members or maybe 
even more, if further European countries come 
in line for membership. This option would call 
for major decisions to be taken on the structure 
of Commission proceedings and the powers of 
the President. 
Option 1 — The Commission is 
composed of fewer members than 
the future number of Member States 
In its contribution of 10 November 1999 for 
the Helsinki European Council, the Commis-
sion made the point that the current way in 
which the Commission operates, 'with new 
powers vested in its President to give political 
orientation directives and decision-making by 
the college on the basis of a simple majority 
of the members, creates an important balance 
which is likely to be disturbed if the number 
of Commissioners is increased'. It held the 
view that in the context of enlargement it 
would be essential to 'preserve the collective 
responsibility, efficiency and decision-making 
methods of an institution whose job is to repre-
sent the public interest in a fully independent 
way and to arbitrate between different Treaty 
goals'. 
This position takes account of the fundamen-
tal difference between the Commission and 
national governments as regards their roles 
and working methods; the cohesiveness of 
national governments comes from shared 
political affiliation or coalition interests and 
is backed up by a parliamentary majority 
enabling them to push through their political 
programmes. This is why national govern-
ments can have as many ministers as they like 
without their ability to act being undermined. 
The institutional set-up of the European 
Union as it currently stands clearly rules out 
anything like this. What gives the Commission 
its cohesiveness and legitimacy is its operation 
as a collective body. 
If this collective operation is to be maintained, 
the future Treaty will have to stabilise the num-
ber of Commissioners at its current level and lay 
down rules governing their appointment. 
Here a number of alternatives have been sug-
gested, such as leaving it for the President to 
form a Commission taking account of the 
cooperation arrangements certain Member 
States already have with their neighbours out-
side the Treaty. This last solution does not 
appear satisfactory, in particular as it raises 
tensions between Member States each time a 
new Commission is appointed, 
In this scenario, the only possible solution is to 
provide in the Treaty a system of rotation that 
would treat all Member States strictly equally 
on the basis of a pre-set order. The rotation 
order should ensure that the composition of 
the Commission is balanced geographically 
and from the viewpoint of the relative size of 
countries. 
In a 28-member Union with the number of 
Commissioners restricted to 20, no nationality 
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would be absent for two successive terms of 
office. Each country would be able to propose 
a Commissioner for five out of seven Commis­
sions. 
Option 2 — Commission made up 
of one national from each Member 
State with its structure overhauled 
to maintain its efficiency 
The Presidency report to the Helsinki Eur­
opean Council maintains that having one 
Commissioner from each Member State is 
the best way of safeguarding the Commission's 
legitimacy. 
Indeed, it is undeniable that the presence in the 
college of a personality from each Member 
State makes dialogue with the citizens of the 
Union easier as they will more easily under­
stand the role the Commission plays in Eur­
opean integration. This perception should 
not lead, however, to the consideration of a 
Commission comprised like the Council as 
yet another system of representation for the 
Member States. 
If the conference were to go for this option, 
there would at the same time need to be a major 
restructuring of the Commission. Various ideas 
were mooted at the last intergovernmental 
conference. Despite their numerous differ­
ences, the ideas put forward share certain 
points in common, and all significantly affect 
the Commission's operation as a collective 
body. In this scenario, the following notably 
would have to be considered: 
D significantly increasing the President's 
power to allocate or not allocate portfolios 
and departments to Members of the Commis­
sion. The result would be that some Commis­
sioners might be given special responsibilities 
only on an ad hoc basis. The choice would 
be for the President; 
D the possibility that the Commissioners 
coordinate and oversee the work of certain 
other colleagues who would be answerable to 
them. It would be logical to provide in the 
Treaty specific powers to this end for Vice­
Presidents whose number could be higher than 
the one the Treaty provides at present; 
D giving more power to direct policy to the 
President, who would then have a casting vote 
in Commission discussions, the power to 
oppose any initiatives he or she deemed inap­
propriate and the power to remove Commis­
sion Members from office; 
D new rules allowing Commissioners to take, 
in the name of the Commission or under its 
responsibility, decisions of daily management. 
However viewed, these restructuring measures 
seem to be dictated by the need to counteract 
the watering­down effect of increasing the 
number of Commissioners and to ensure that 
in a wider Union a Commission made up in 
the same way as the Council would keep its 
distinctive role of identifying and promoting 
the general interest. 
Commission proposals to the conference: 
ie composition of the Commission should be reviewed, with the number of Commis­
sioners set at 20, with a system of rotation institutionalised in the Treaty while respecting 
the strict equality between the Member States, or set at one member per Member State com­
bined with measures fundamentally reorganising the Commission; 
■ the undertaking given by the Members of the present Commission to resign if asked to do 
so by the President should be formally incorporated in the Treaty. 
12 S. 2/2000 
5. The European Union's judicial system 
(a) The Court of Justice and 
the Court of First Instance 
The Court of Justice is essential to the Eur-
opean Union: its duty is to ensure that the 
law is observed in the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Treaty (Article 220). 
In the Commission's view, the conference will 
need to examine the composition and opera-
tion of the Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance to cope not only with enlarge-
ment, but also with the strain the Community 
judicial system is currently under. 
The time it takes for cases to be dealt with by 
the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance, as revealed by their own statistics, 
is proof that these bodies are just about reach-
ing maximum capacity. With enlargement they 
will not be equipped to cope with their 
increased workload within acceptable time-
scales. This is a worrying state of affairs in a 
Community based on the rule of law, a mere 
10 years since the Court of First Instance 
was set up and with enlargement just round 
the corner. 
As stated in the Court of Justice/Court of First 
Instance discussion paper on the future of the 
Community judicial system, which was 
released on 10 May 1999 for the intergovern-
mental conference, the caseload, which has 
always been heavy, has mushroomed since 
the Amsterdam Treaty. The Community judi-
cial system is being called on to exercise new 
specialised powers that have been or are to 
be conferred on it by the Treaties. 
The implications of this go without saying: the 
structures that were originally designed for six 
Member States will have to be overhauled, 
possibly quite thoroughly, to enable the Com-
munity judicial system to deal with all the 
work required. The overhaul of the system will 
have to take due account of certain important 
considerations, such as securing effective judi-
cial review, maintaining quality and consis-
tency in judicial practice and ensuring that it 
is complied with throughout the Union. 
In order to have the benefit of an independent 
expert opinion on the future of the Commu-
nity judicial system, the Commission has asked 
a reflection group, chaired by Mr Ole Due, 
former President of the Court of Justice, to 
report on the various alternatives for dealing 
with the set of issues involved. The group's 
report, which is to be produced in conjunction 
with the Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance, is to be submitted to the Com-
mission at the end of January. 
On this basis, the Commission will at a later 
stage be submitting a contribution dedicated 
to this specific issue. It will be necessary to 
review the Court's present jurisdiction notably 
to enable it to hear cases concerning the issue 
of Community intellectual property rights to 
confer on it full jurisdiction to hear cases con-
cerning such rights generally. 
(b) Protecting the 
Community's financial 
interests 
The Commission is convinced that the Com-
munity must urgently equip itself with truly 
effective means of combating fraud and 
defending the Community's financial interests. 
The creation of the European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF) is undoubtedly a major step 
forward in detecting offences. However, crim-
inal prosecution requires cooperation with 15 
judicial orders applying different substantive 
and procedural rules. The problem is that 
fraud often goes across borders, while national 
police and judicial authorities can only act on 
their own territory; moreover, traditional judi-
cial assistance and police cooperation arrange-
ments are cumbersome and mostly ill-suited 
to effectively fighting cross-border fraud. 
Furthermore, experience has shown the diffi-
culties involved in actually getting cases to 
court where administrative investigations 
point to grounds for criminal prosecution. 
The Commission therefore suggests supple-
menting the current provisions by a legal basis 
allowing the establishment of a system of rules 
related to: 
D the offences involved and the penalties they 
carry; 
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D the provisions of necessary procedures for 
prosecuting such cases; 
D the provisions governing the tasks and the 
role of a European public prosecutor responsi­
ble for the investigation on the whole of the 
European territory for fraud and its prosecu­
tion before national courts. 
National courts, in upholding Community 
law, would thus apply to this specific category 
of offence the same rules incorporated into the 
national judicial order, just as today they 
already apply the rules of Community law in 
all the areas of the EC Treaty. 
Commission proposal to the conference: 
■ supplement the current provisions relating to protecting the Community's financial inter­
ests by a legal basis in view of setting up a system of rules relating to criminal proceedings 
in cross­border fraud, notably by the establishment of a European public prosecutor. 
6. The Court of Auditors 
The Court of Auditors was established by the 
Treaty of 22 July 1975. It looks into the legal­
ity and regularity of revenue and expenditure 
and the soundness of financial management. 
As the Communities' budget is implemented 
by the Commission (Article 274 of the EC 
Treaty), the role of the Court of Auditors con­
sists essentially of monitoring the Commis­
sion's activities. 
The role of the members of the Court of Audi­
tors is to direct the audit activities of the 
Court's staff, to draw up annual and special 
reports and to deliver opinions to the other 
institutions. These reports and opinions are 
adopted by a majority of members. Members 
of the Court of Auditors must be completely 
independent in the performance of their duties 
and may neither seek nor take instructions 
from any government. 
The Court of Auditors currently has 15 mem­
bers. They are appointed for a six­year term 
and may be re­appointed. Although the Treaty 
does not stipulate that the Court of Auditors 
must be made up of a national of each Mem­
ber State, this has always been the case in prac­
tice. As a result, the number of members of the 
Court of Auditors has always increased with 
each new accession, though without any in­
depth assessment of its tasks and require­
ments. 
The Commission feels that the time has come 
to break with this tradition in order to pre­
serve the institution's effectiveness. Although 
the Community budget increases with each 
stage of enlargement, this does not lead to a 
corresponding increase in the need for audits 
or for reports. The Commission does not 
believe it is necessary to increase the number 
of Court members. 
The nature of the duties of the members of the 
Court argues more for the number to remain 
unchanged or even to be reduced, given that 
there is no really convincing argument in 
favour of the appointment of a national of 
each Member State. 
In the Commission's view, the number of mem­
bers of the Court of Auditors could be fixed at 
12. The Commission's proposal is to appoint 
members of the Court of Auditors using a rota 
system, which will only work if members' 
terms are not renewable. 
Commission proposals to the conference 
iber of members of the Court of Auditors should be fixed at 12; 
■ the six­year term of office should be non­renewable. 
■HnBRMRHIHHHiHHHHMHHHHHIHHHHHHBHHHH^HIHRnlBHnBMSl 
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7. The Economic and Social Committee 
The Economic and Social Committee was 
established by the EEC Treaty to involve the 
various categories of economic and social 
interests in the creation of the common mar­
ket. The Economic and Social Committee is 
consulted by the other institutions where the 
Treaty so requires, particularly as part of the 
legislative procedure. The Committee may 
deliver opinions in other cases at the request 
of the other institutions or on its own initia­
tive. 
The original task of the Economic and Social 
Committee was to complement the consulta­
tive role of the Community's Parliamentary 
Assembly, which in those days consisted of 
delegates from the national parliaments. The 
situation is obviously quite different now that 
the European Parliament is elected by direct 
universal suffrage and enjoys extensive powers 
as a co­legislator. In this context, and taking 
into account the evolution of the Union, the 
Commission recommends that the conference 
should re­examine the role of the Committee 
and adapt its composition and tasks. In the 
future, the Economic and Social Committee 
will have to establish itself as the framework 
for the consultation between the social and 
economic partners. 
The Commission feels that the Committee 
should be more representative of the various 
components of civil society of the European 
Union as a whole and of its different geogra­
phical aspects. This supposes that one has to 
reflect on the representation of civil society 
and on the means to supplement the represen­
tation by category referred to in the Treaty 
(Article 257). One should also examine the des­
ignation of representatives by the Member 
States. 
The reformed Economic and Social Commit­
tee could act as a relay vis­à­vis civil society. 
There would need to be a rethink of its role 
regarding legislative opinions, and the texts 
of the Treaty would have to be adapted to 
allow the Committee to judge for itself 
whether it should issue an opinion on propo­
sals. The European institutions would still be 
able to ask the Committee for an opinion. 
At present, the Committee has 222 members 
appointed for four years; their term of office 
is renewable. Seats are shared out among the 
Member States (each one having between 6 
and 24 members). If the number of members 
were extrapolated on the basis of the current 
allocation of seats, a Union of 28 Member 
States would mean an Economic and Social 
Committee of around 370 members. The Com­
mission considers that the total number of 
Committee members should be set at a level, 
which would allow it to continue to operate 
effectively. This supposes a freeze on the num­
ber of the members around its current level. 
Commission proposals to the conference: 
■ the Economic and Social Committee should be more representative of civil society of the 
European Union; 
■ re­examine, in consequence, the unique distribution of seats by Member State and by 
socioeconomic category; 
■ to allow the Committee to judge for itself whether it should pronounce itself on legislative 
matters; 
■ fix the number of Its members around its current level. 
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8. The Committee of the Regions 
The Committee of the Regions is an advisory 
committee made up of representatives of regio­
nal and local authorities. It was set up by the 
Treaty of Maastricht and currently has 222 
members. 
The Committee's mission is to represent at 
European level the interests of regional and 
local authorities and to promote integration 
between regions of Europe. In the enlarged 
Union cooperation between regions will 
become even more important, as will evalua­
tion of the regional impact of proposed legisla­
tion. Hence the continuing importance of the 
Committee's advisory role. 
Contrary to the situation of the Economic and 
Social Committee, distribution of seats by 
Member State is still appropriate for the Com­
mittee of the Regions, in view of its role of 
representing the interests of the regional and 
local authorities of the Member States. It is 
desirable that the members of the Committee 
remain linked to these collectivities by a politi­
cal mandate. 
However, the number of seats allocated to 
each Member State should now be reviewed, 
as they do not adequately reflect the size and 
population of the regions concerned. Extrapo­
lation of the system currently used would, in a 
28­member Union, provide a Committee of 
the Regions of around 370 members, with only 
142 for the seven most populous countries 
which account for over 70 % of the Union's 
total population. 
It would therefore be desirable, without weak­
ening the present efficiency of the Committee, 
to make sure there is a division and a balanced 
presence of the regional and local authorities 
of the present and future Member States. 
The Commission believes that the composition 
of the Committee of the Regions should be 
determined in the same way as for the Eur­
opean Parliament. In the opinion delivered at 
its session on 15 and 16 September 1999 ('), 
the numbers envisaged by the Committee of 
the Regions are a third or half of the number 
of MEPs for each Member State. Since the 
members of the Committee of the Regions 
have alternates, the Commission's view is that 
the number of members should not exceed one 
third of the number of MEPs (a maximum 
therefore of 233 members). 
Commission propos als to the conferenc 
the number of members of the Committee of the Regions should be limited to one third of 
the number of MEPs; 
■ the distribution key between Member States should be the same as that used for 
Parliament. 
(i) Opinion 52/99 ­
heart of Europe. 
Local and regional government at the 
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Chapter 2 — An effective decision-making 
process 
1. Introduction 
Enlargement will affect not only the operation 
and composition of each institution but also 
the decision-making process of the Union. 
Already today, the decision-making process 
of the Union is not always very efficient. The 
present provisions are the result of successive 
amendments to the Treaties, but are not 
always very coherent. Rationalisation is cer-
tainly necessary. 
This rationalisation, necessary today, is even 
more important in the perspective of enlarge-
ment. Decision-making in a Union of 28 mem-
bers is clearly not the same thing as decision-
making in a Union of 15. The Union will inevi-
tably become less homogeneous; the economic, 
cultural and political differences between the 
Member States will be more pronounced than 
ever before in the history of European integra-
tion. 
It is therefore essential that we preserve the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process 
which has helped to make the Union what it 
is today; in other words, a process which 
ensures that the Union's decisions reflect the 
political will of the representatives of a large 
majority of the Union's citizens, while at the 
same time avoiding the need for unanimity in 
most fields, thereby combining legitimacy with 
a degree of flexibility. If the Union were to 
become less effective and less well equipped 
to act, the integration process would come to 
a halt. The new Member States would be join-
ing a Union that was incapable of action and 
that was likely to be eventually replaced by 
other forms of integration capable of overcom-
ing the inertia of a structure that had been ill-
prepared for enlargement. 
A firm commitment is therefore needed for 
reforming the decision-making process, in the 
sense of the arrangements for reaching deci-
sions within the Council, considered from the 
point of view of the legitimacy of its decisions 
and the Union's capacity to act. In this respect, 
enlargement should not have any impact on 
the European Parliament. 
This would mean that unanimity would be 
required only when there are serious and last-
ing reasons for doing so and that decision-
making procedures will be made more coher-
ent. It is also important to enhance the legiti-
macy of decisions taken by qualified majority, 
so that they are genuinely representative of the 
balance between the different Member States. 
Finally, the provisions on closer cooperation 
must be made more operational to enable cer-
tain Member States to go beyond the level of 
integration common to all members, within 
the institutional framework of the Union. 
2. Limiting the use of unanimity 
The vast majority of decisions that have to be 
taken by the Council now require the approval 
of a qualified majority of the Member States. 
However, despite the amendments to the Trea-
ties introduced by the Single European Act, 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, a significant number of Council 
decisions still require unanimity, in some cases 
in conjunction with the co-decision procedure. 
Except, of course, in the cases where the Coun-
cil decides by simple majority, the Commission 
proposes that the conference limits the excep-
tions of unanimity and confirms that qualified 
majority is the general rule for decision-mak-
ing in the Council. 
It is essential that this principle be applied. 
When unanimity is required, the risk of dead-
lock increases exponentially with the number 
and diversity of the participants. A decision 
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by qualified majority currently requires the 
support of at least 8 to 12 Member States. 
The scope of qualified-majority voting has 
been progressively extended with each succes-
sive enlargement of the Union. However, this 
evolution has never followed any predeter-
mined logic. This was true of the framing of 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The Dutch Presidency tried to 
introduce logical criteria in Amsterdam, but 
the debate rapidly degenerated into a case-
by-case approach. The result is neither fully 
coherent nor suited to the needs of an effective 
Union. 
It is absolutely essential that during the next 
conference clear and simple criteria be formu-
lated so that the debate can focus on large 
categories of decision rather than individual 
cases. In this respect, the Presidency's report 
to the Helsinki European Council has shown 
the way. 
For the purpose of defining these categories, 
the Commission proposes as a starting point 
the principle that, leaving aside cases where 
the Council decides by simple majority, quali-
fied-majority voting should be the rule and 
unanimity the exception ('). It is therefore 
important to consider the categories of decision 
for which serious and lasting reasons warrant 
maintaining unanimity, in the knowledge that 
unanimity in an enlarged Europe will make 
decision-making extremely difficult and, in 
the case of some policies, will mean the end of 
any serious prospect of deepening European 
integration. 
The Commission has identified five categories 
of provisions for which serious and lasting rea-
sons warrant making an exception to the gen-
eral rule of qualified-majority voting. A list of 
provisions of the EC Treaty that would remain 
subject to unanimity by virtue of these criteria 
is given in Annex 1 (2). An indicative list of 
provisions of the EC Treaty, which would as 
a result require decision-making in the Council 
by qualified majority, is given in Annex 2. 
(i) Council decisions which must be 
adopted by the Member States in 
accordance with their constitutional 
rules 
A small number of provisions stipulate unani-
mous decision-making by the Council and 
adoption by the Member States, in accordance 
with their respective constitutional require-
ments. These decisions enter into force only 
after ratification by the Parliaments of the 
Member States. It would seem to be right to 
ensure unanimous agreement on such deci-
sions between the governments of the Member 
States at Community level before national rati-
fication procedures are started. Article 269 of 
the EC Treaty on the system of own resources 
is an example of such provisions. 
(') The Commission does not exclude the possibility of having 
recourse to a form of reinforced qualified majority, in cer-
tain cases, in a transitional manner. 
p) The Commission has so far confined its analysis to the EC 
Treaty. Annexes 1 and 2 to this opinion do not, therefore, 
include the legal bases of the Treaty on European Union, 
nor those provided for in the ECSC and Euratom Treaties, 
nor the other pieces of primary legislation (acts of acces-
sion, protocols). The Commission intends to present its 
proposals for the other pieces of primary legislation to 
the conference at a later date. 
Nor do the annexes include those provisions of the EC 
Treaty that specify a decision 'by common accord' of the 
governments of the Member States and which, by their 
very nature, require their unanimous agreement, namely 
appointment of the Governing Council of the ECB (Arti-
cle 112(2) of the EC Treaty), nomination of the Commis-
sion (Article 214(2) of the EC Treaty; the second para-
graph of Article 215 of the EC Treaty), appointment of 
the members of the Court of Justice and Court of First 
Instance (Articles 223 and 225(3) of the EC Treaty), and 
determination of the seat of the institutions (Article 289 
of the EC Treaty). 
(ii) Essential institutional decisions 
and decisions affecting the 
institutional balance 
Certain fundamental rules relating to the orga-
nisation and operation of the institutions, par-
ticularly those underpinning the institutional 
balance, are, where no direct provision is made 
in the Treaties, decided by the Council acting 
unanimously. These are undoubtedly provi-
sions where there is a case for retaining unani-
mity. Examples are Article 290 of the EC 
Treaty on the languages of the institutions 
and Article 202 of the EC Treaty on the exer-
cise of implementing powers by the Commis-
sion (comitology procedure). 
Similarly, an essential provision for the institu-
tional balance is Article 250(1) of the EC 
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Treaty, which stipulates that the Council may 
not adopt an act constituting an amendment 
to a Commission proposal unless it is acting 
unanimously ('). 
(iii) Decisions in the fields of tax and 
social security not related to the proper 
functioning of the internal market 
Because they reflect the fundamental views of 
the national government on matters of eco-
nomic and social policy, and solidarity, tax 
and social security heavily influence voters' 
domestic political choices. On a general level, 
this justifies maintaining the unanimity 
requirement for decisions by the Council in 
these fields. The Commission does not propose 
a global extension to qualified majority voting. 
However, certain aspects of these two fields 
are inseparable from the proper functioning of 
the internal market and, in particular, the four 
fundamental freedoms (free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital). Because 
of insufficient progress in the acquis commu-
nautaire, there are still serious impediments 
to the working of the internal market, as it 
notably results from the case-law of the Court. 
On several occasions, the national measures, 
which unduly restrict the exercise of the inter-
nal market, have been regularly declared 
incompatible with the Treaty. It is unsatisfac-
tory for the public to have to take legal action 
in order to obtain recognition of rights secured 
by the Treaties. At the same time, it is far from 
ideal for the Member States if Community law 
in this area is developed on an ad hoc basis by 
judgments of the Court of Justice rather than 
via the political process. 
A common approach is called for to remove 
such obstacles to the proper functioning of 
the internal market, particularly when these 
obstacles lead to discrimination, double taxa-
tion or tax avoidance. The effectiveness 
requirement demands qualified-majority voting 
on these tax questions in so far as it is necessary 
for the proper functioning of the internal mar-
ket. It is not therefore the intention to move 
towards general harmonisation of national sys-
tems, tax bases and tax rates. The principle 
of subsidiarity is applicable in any event. 
(0 As Article 250 of the EC Treaty is not strictly speaking a 
legal base, it does not appear in Annex 1. 
In addition, qualified-majority voting should 
be applied when legislation has already been 
harmonised, in order to simplify and moder-
nise existing rules and ensure they are applied 
more uniformly. This applies in particular to 
the common VAT system and the movement 
of and controls on goods subject to excise 
duty. 
The Commission proposes the adoption of the 
same approach for social security, where coor-
dination of national legislation has existed for 
several decades (Regulation No 1408/71). For 
reasons of effectiveness, it should be possible 
to update this regulation by qualified majority. 
Finally, the Commission is firmly committed 
to fighting fraud, which has become an 
increasing problem with the removal of tax 
frontiers for goods and the liberalisation of 
capital movements. Qualified-majority voting 
should therefore also apply to measures aimed 
at preventing tax avoidance and tax fraud. 
The approach advocated by the Commission 
requires a careful examination of the Treaty 
provisions concerned and their redrafting in 
order to identify within these articles the deci-
sions, which should be subject to a qualified 
majority and those, which require unanimity. 
The Commission will present detailed propo-
sals to this effect in due course. 
(iv) Parallel internal and external 
decisions 
Article 300 of the EC Treaty provides for par-
allelism between the type of majority applic-
able to internal legal bases and the decision-
making procedure for the conclusion of inter-
national agreements. If the internal legal basis 
requires unanimity for a particular field, the 
Council will likewise be required to act unani-
mously when concluding agreements relating 
to this field. The Commission believes there 
is a case for maintaining this parallelism. How-
ever, the strict parallelism does not seem neces-
sary when international agreements require the 
adoption of additional implementing mea-
sures. This applies to the case of cooperation 
agreements concluded in the framework of 
the ACP-EC conventions, where a simplifica-
tion of the decision-making methods for the 
adoption of internal rules of procedure would 
be desirable. 
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(ν) Derogation's from common 
Treaty rules 
The rules in the Treaty apply to all institutions 
and all Member States, as does the acquis com­
munautaire developed on this basis. The dero­
gations from this acquis, provided for by the 
Treaty in a number of highly exceptional cases, 
represent a retrograde step in terms of the 
objectives of the Union. The Commission 
believes it is right that such exceptions, which 
include the possibility, provided for in Article 
88 of the EC Treaty, for the Council to declare 
a State aid measure that is in theory contrary 
to the Treaty compatible with the internal 
market, should continue to be subject to 
unanimity in the Council. 
Commission proposals to the conference: 
■ decision­making by qualified majority should be the rule; 
■ the categories of provision should be determined for which serious and lasting reasons 
warrant maintaining unanimity, by way of exception to the general rule of qualified­majority 
voting. 
3. Decision­making procedures 
The changes proposed in the previous section 
will have to be supplemented by a comprehen­
sive review of decision­making procedures 
with a view to eliminating certain anomalies 
from the Treaty. It is vital for the smooth 
operation of the enlarged Union to ensure that 
provisions governing the various areas of 
activity are consistent, and it is important for 
European citizens that the decision­making 
structures should be simple and logical, and 
consequently easily understood. The review 
should focus on the links between qualified­
majority voting and the co­decision procedure, 
and on elimination of the cooperation proce­
dure, and should emphasise the European Par­
liament's participation in certain policies cov­
ered by the Treaty. 
(a) Link between qualified-
majority voting and the 
co-decision procedure for 
legislative decisions 
The European Parliament's participation in 
exercising legislative power by co­decision with 
the Council reinforces the democratic nature 
of Community action ('). In many respects, co­
decision in legislative matters would seem to 
be a necessary companion to decisions by qua­
lified majority, since by its nature this type of 
decision will inevitably place some Member 
States in a minority. This is why, pursuant to 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, 
today legislative decisions mainly depend on 
both qualified­majority voting and co­deci­
sion. A two­pronged effort is needed to elimi­
nate certain anomalies and improve the consis­
tency of decision­making procedures. 
First of all, there are still four provisions in 
the Treaty (Articles 18, 42, 47 and 151 of the 
EC Treaty) where the co­decision procedure 
coexists with unanimity. Making qualified­
majority voting the rule would bring this situa­
tion to an end and would restore the usefulness 
of co­decision. 
Secondly, decisions of a legislative nature 
adopted by a qualified majority must be asso­
ciated with the co­decision procedure. This link 
will result in an extension of the scope of co­
decision. It is believed, for reasons of efficiency, 
(') Commission report under Article 189b(8) of the Treaty on 
the scope of the co­decision procedure (SEC(96) 1225, 
3 July 1996). 
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that the Parliament will have to establish inter-
nal procedures with a fixed deadline allowing 
legislative decisions to be taken quickly. In 
addition, it will be necessary to define what is 
a legislative act. It is roughly defined here as 
rules of general scope, based directly on the 
Treaty and which determine the fundamental 
principles or general guidelines for any Com-
munity action, and the essential aspects to be 
implemented. The chosen solution for the writ-
ing of Article 37 in annex could be useful as a 
basis of reflection to which the Commission will 
contribute during the course of the conference. 
The current provisions of the Treaty would all 
have to be reviewed. This extension of the 
scope of co-decision would, for instance, affect 
certain aspects of the common commercial 
policy, the common agricultural policy and 
common fisheries policy. Since they are legisla-
tion, the common commercial policy rules, such 
as basic anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules, 
trade barrier defence arrangements and regula-
tions laying down general import and export 
rules should be adopted by co-decision. The 
same applies to the legislative aspects of the 
common agricultural policy and common fish-
eries policy. As it said at the last intergovern-
mental conference, the Commission considers 
that the vast majority of measures adopted in 
this area are strictly concerned with manage-
ment and do not qualify as legislation. On 
the other hand, co-decision should be applied 
to a number of fundamental measures con-
cerning the formulation and direction of the 
common agricultural policy and common fish-
eries policy ('). 
With a view to qualified-majority voting becom-
ing the rule, it will have to be considered 
whether the provisions which require unani-
mity are, by reason of their legislative nature, 
suitable for the co-decision procedure. The 
Commission has set out in Annex 2 (Heading 
A) the provisions which might be concerned. 
In this context, Article 67(2) of the EC Treaty 
should be mentioned. This particular provi-
sion provides that five years after the entry 
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (i.e. after 
1 May 2004) the Council can, acting unani-
mously, extend the co-decision procedure to 
all or some of the areas covered by Title IV 
(') Commission report under Article 189b(8) of the Treaty on 
the scope of the co-decision procedure (SEC(96) 1225, 
3 July 1996, p. 12). 
of the EC Treaty. At this stage, the Commis-
sion is not proposing that the five-year period 
be shortened. However, if qualified-majority 
voting were the rule and a link established with 
co-decision, decisions would have to be taken 
automatically by the co-decision procedure for 
all Title IV matters. 
(b) Extending the scope of 
Article 133 to all services, 
investment and intellectual 
property rights 
Under Article 133(5) of the EC Treaty the 
Council can, acting unanimously, extend the 
mechanisms of the common commercial policy 
to international negotiations and agreements 
on services and intellectual property. In the 
Commission's view, this provision will not be 
suitable in future when there are twice as many 
Member States. With qualified-majority vot-
ing the rule, some changes would be needed 
to this part of Article 133, but the essential 
aspects of this complicated and uncertain deci-
sion-making procedure would be retained. The 
Commission would prefer a substantial 
amendment of the scope of Article 133 by 
extending it to services, investment and intel-
lectual property rights. Article 133 of the EC 
Treaty should be redrafted accordingly. 
(c) Elimination of the 
cooperation procedure 
In the Commission's view, the cooperation pro-
cedure (Article 252 of the EC Treaty) which 
was the forerunner of co-decision should be 
eliminated. The Treaty of Amsterdam replaced 
the cooperation procedure by co-decision 
throughout the EC Treaty with the exception 
of certain provisions relating to economic 
and monetary union (Articles 99(5); 102(2); 
103(2) and 106(2) of the EC Treaty. There is 
no longer any need to maintain this distinction 
between the provisions of EMU and the other 
provisions of the EC Treaty. In addition, the 
cooperation procedure should be eliminated 
for the sake of clarity and simplicity of the 
Treaties. The provisions in question should 
provide for co-decision where they concern 
the adoption of acts of a legislative nature. 
The conference should consult the European 
Central Bank on institutional changes in the 
monetary area. 
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(d) Competence of the 
European Parliament 
In non­legislative matters, the European Par­
liament's participation in the decision­making 
process takes various forms, including assent. 
However, with respect to certain provisions 
for the implementation of the policies of the 
Union, the Treaty currently does not provide 
for any action by Parliament. The Commis­
sion considers this situation should be recti­
fied. 
Extending co­decision to legislative matters in 
the field of the common commercial policy 
would mean extending the consultation proce­
dure under Article 300(3) of the EC Treaty to 
trade agreements with one or more States or 
international organisations. It would, more­
over, be necessary to make sure that agree­
ments with important economic and commer­
cial implications worldwide could only be 
concluded following the assent of the Eur­
opean Parliament. 
If it is to exercise this role in full knowledge of 
the facts, the European Parliament must be 
kept regularly informed of the progress of 
negotiations between the Community and 
one or more States or international organisa­
tions. This would require an adjustment of 
Article 133(3) of the Treaty. 
Commission proposals to the conference: 
a link should be established between qualified­majority voting and the co­decision proce­
dure for all decisions of a legislative nature; 
■ the scope of Article 133 should be extended to all services, investment and intellectual 
property rights; 
■ the cooperation procedure should be eliminated; 
■ provision should be made for consultation of the European Parliament to be mandatory 
before commercial agreements are concluded between the Community and one or more 
States, or international organisations, and assent of the Parliament before the conclusion 
of agreements with important economic and commercial implications worldwide. 
4. Determining the qualified majority in the Council 
(a) The current system and the 
outlook 
The Council represents the democratically 
elected governments of the Member States, 
answerable to the national Parliaments. 
Article 205 of the EC Treaty provides that, 
'save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, 
the Council shall act by a majority of its mem­
bers'. But the authors of the original Treaties 
took account of the fact that the Member 
States were not demographically comparable. 
The qualified­majority system based on dis­
tinctions between Member States was accord­
ingly provided for to avert the risk of paralysis 
that is inherent in unanimity and to strengthen 
the democratic representativeness of Council 
decisions. 
The authors of the Treaty opted for a system of 
weighted votes reflecting the population of the 
Member States, with a heavy correction for 
the less populous Member States so that the 
individuality of each country could be taken 
into account. The qualified majority threshold 
— the minimum number of votes required as a 
percentage of the total — was set at an inter­
mediate level between the simple majority of 
the number of votes and unanimity. It has 
always been just above 70 %. The effect of suc­
cessive enlargements has been to preserve the 
original balance more or less, except as regards 
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the democratic representativeness of decisions 
taken by qualified majority (')· 
The qualified majority has always represented 
a large majority in terms of population of the 
Member States supporting the decision. With 
the successive additions of nine new members, 
the threshold required for a qualified majority 
has risen slightly. The deliberate imbalance 
originally sought has also increased, to the det-
riment of the most populous Member States. 
The minimum population required for a quali-
fied majority has thus passed from 67 % (6 
Member States) to 70% (9 and 10 Member 
States) and is now 58% (15 Member States). 
The effect of weighting the votes has been that 
the qualified majority always represents at 
least half the Member States. 
Regarding the blocking minority, a qualified-
majority Council decision can be blocked 
either by the three most populous Member 
States acting together or by a group of the less 
populous Member States representing, since 
1973, between 12 and 13 % of the total popu-
lation. 
Extrapolation (table, Annex 3) shows that, if 
the current system of weighting of votes of 
members of the Council is preserved, most of 
the parameters would remain fairly stable, 
with a regular decline in the representativeness 
of a qualified-majority decision in population 
terms. 
When the Union reaches 28 Member States 
with a qualified-majority threshold of 102 
out of 144 votes (70.83%), a decision might 
be taken by qualified majority, in an extreme 
situation, by a combination of States repre-
senting 51.35 % of the total Union population. 
In a Union of 27 members (2) and with a qua-
lified majority threshold at 95 out of 134 votes 
(70.90%), the percentage would be 50.20%. 
With a threshold of 94 out of 134 votes 
(70.15 %), a decision could be taken by quali-
fied majority by a combination of States repre-
senting only 46.41 % of the Union population. 
True, in these extreme and probably theoreti-
cal cases, the agreement of 23 out of 27 or 28 
Member States will be needed. But this decline 
in representativeness in terms of population is 
the arithmetical outcome of enlargement if the 
current system of weighting and calculating 
the qualified majority are preserved as they 
stand. The reason is that only 3 of the 13 cur-
rent applicant countries have a larger popula-
tion than the average of the existing Member 
States. 
(b) Preserving the legitimacy 
of Council decisions in an 
enlarged Union 
To offset the effects of enlargement, a simpler 
system more closely reflecting the relative 
weight of the Member States will have to be 
established. 
Option 1 — Re-weighting the votes 
of the Member States 
If the relative weightings of the votes of the 
Member States are unchanged, the arrival of 

















































a — year. 
b — number of Member States of the Community or Union. 
c — total votes. 
d — qualified majority (votes and percentage). 
e — minimum number of Member States required for a qualified majority. 
ƒ — minimum population required for a qualified majority (%). 
g — minimum number of Member States required for a blocking minority. 
A — minimum population represented by a combination of votes constituting the smallest blocking minority ( %) . 
(2) With all the countries that have opened or are due to open negotiations at the start of 2000. 
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13 new countries, only 3 of which have a popu-
lation in excess of the average of the existing 
Member States, will amplify the imbalances 
that have gradually emerged between popu-
lous and less populous Member States as each 
round of enlargement has its effect. 
Re-weighting is consequently expressly men-
tioned in the protocol on the institutions with 
the prospect of enlargement of the European 
Union, annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty. 
Two parameters need to be considered: the 
number of votes given to each Member of the 
Council and the threshold, meaning the mini-
mum number of votes, expressed as a percen-
tage of the total, required for a decision. To 
define these parameters, the objective must be 
to avoid making decision-making more difficult 
and to ensure that the qualified majority of 
Member States represents a percentage of the 
Union's total population that is close to the ori-
ginal balance. 
To avoid making decision-making more diffi-
cult, the threshold should be stabilised, once 
and for all in the Treaty, eventually at less than 
the present level, in the range of 71 %. The 
only decision to be taken at each accession 
thereafter would be the new parameter — the 
number of votes given to the acceding country. 
To restore the representativeness of the qualified 
majority and reinstate the original balance, the 
relative weight of the votes of the most populous 
Member States should be increased. Re-weight-
ing should have the effect that the qualified 
majority represents at least two thirds or so 
of the Union's total population. 
But it should be noted that this re-weighting 
would no longer guarantee that a decision 
taken by qualified majority would involve at 
least half the total number of Member States, 
as is the case today. It might then be desirable 
to write into the Treaty a provision that a deci-
sion taken by qualified majority must be sup-
ported by at least half the Member States. This 
would effectively codify what has already been 
the arithmetical consequence of weightings 
ever since the original Treaties. 
ing of the citizens on re-weighting of votes. It 
is therefore preferable to include in the 
Treaty, in a clear and definitive way, the con-
ditions for decision-making of the Council. 
This will provide for a readable, simple and 
democratic decision-making process in the 
Council. The Commission recommends to 
foresee that decisions of qualified majority vot-
ing will be taken if: 
D it had the support of a simple majority of 
Member States ('); 
D it represented a majority of the total popula-
tion of the Union. 
Redefining the qualified majority in this way 
would be a token of transparency in relation 
to Europe's citizens. 
This double majority is radically different 
from certain proposals examined by the pre-
ceding intergovernmental conference, whereby 
the qualified majority would require both a 
qualified majority of the population and a 
qualified majority of the number of votes 
expressed. The Commission considers that 
those proposals run counter to the general 
objective of simplicity and transparency and 
would, in addition, make decision-making far 
more complex and difficult. 
The effect of the double simple majority would 
be to directly take account of the relative 
weight of the Member States in terms of popu-
lation, which would be to the benefit of the 
most populous Member States. Their weight 
would, by definition, be maintained upon suc-
cessive enlargements. Coupled with the obliga-
tion to combine at least half the Member 
States, the method would make it impossible 
for a few Member States with large popula-
tions to take a decision against a majority of 
smaller Member States. This latter condition 
puts all the Member States on an equal foot-
ing, irrespective of their size in demographic 
terms. 
The practical difficulties of the double simple 
majority lie chiefly in the actual calculation 
Option 2 — Double simple majority 
Whilst recognising its merits, the Commission 
underlines the complexity for the understand-
(0 But the Commission considers that the rule in the second 
subparagraph of Article 205(2), whereby a decision by 
qualified majority requires the votes of at least two thirds 
of the Member States if it is not taken on a Commission 
proposal, should be maintained. 
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of the qualified majority. There would have to 
be a definition of the population figures to be 
used: what reference year, what review inter­
vals? 
But, the double simple majority has the advan­
tage of simplicity and transparency. Moreover, 
the system would not have to be modified with 
each new accession. 
«mgagxgggmm 
Commission proposal to the conference: 
■ whilst recognising the merits of the system of re­weighting of votes, which would ensure 
that the qualified majority represents about two thirds of the Union's population, with no 
possibility for a decision to be taken by a minority of Member States, the Commission 
recommends to foresee In the Treaty that a decision taken by qualified majority requires 
the simple majority of Member States representing a majority of the Union's total population. 
5. Closer cooperation 
The Amsterdam Treaty incorporated in the 
Treaties general provisions permitting the 
Member States, under certain conditions, to 
establish closer cooperation between them­
selves by making use of the institutions, proce­
dures and mechanisms laid down by the Trea­
ties (Articles 43 to 45 and 40 of the Treaty on 
European Union; Article 11 of the EC Treaty). 
There is no provision for closer cooperation in 
the field of common foreign and security pol­
icy, which does, however, provide for 'con­
structive abstention' (second paragraph of 
Article 23(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union). 
The character of the forthcoming enlargement 
justifies making these new provisions as prac­
ticable as possible. The greater diversity within 
a larger Union must not be allowed to stand in 
the way of the wishes of some members to 
make use of the Union's institutional frame­
work to cooperate more closely together. 
The Commission does not recommend amend­
ing the basic conditions laid down in Article 
11(1) of the EC Treaty and Article 43(1) of 
the Treaty on European Union. It considers 
it essential to preserve the Community acquis 
and the common basis for Community policies 
already developed by the 15 Member States. 
The provisions on closer cooperation should 
not be used to ease the requirements on future 
Member States. In some areas it will be neces­
sary to agree on transition periods so that the 
new Member States can gradually apply the 
full acquis of the Union. On the other hand, 
there can be no compromise on the content 
of this acquis or on the need to achieve this 
convergence. This lies at the very heart of the 
enlargement process. 
On the other hand, the Commission proposes 
making two changes to the formal conditions 
currently laid down by the Treaties for the 
establishment of closer cooperation. The need 
to resort to arrangements for closer coopera­
tion could increase with enlargement. We must 
ensure that Member States wishing to coop­
erate more closely together do not do so out­
side the institutional framework laid down by 
the Treaties, as happened for example with 
the Schengen Agreement before the Treaty 
offered them an alternative. 
The first change relates to the minimum 
number of Member States needed to set up 
closer cooperation within the Union's institu­
tional framework. The Treaty as it stands 
states that closer cooperation must concern 
at least a majority of Member States (Article 
43(1)), which at the moment means a mini­
mum of eight. The Commission believes that 
the threshold of one third of Member States 
should be foreseen after enlargement. The 
basic conditions governing closer cooperation 
are, in fact, strict enough to prevent such 
initiatives becoming too numerous and lead­
ing to excessive fragmentation of the Union 
— bearing in mind that the agreement of a 
qualified majority of Member States must be 
obtained for the establishment of this closer 
cooperation. 
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The second change consists of putting an 
end to the right of a Member State to 
request a unanimous decision in the Eur­
opean Council if it is opposed to the decision 
by a qualified majority of Member States 
authorising closer cooperation. In the larger 
Union such a veto would present too great 
an obstacle to the — essential — implemen­
tation of the mechanism for closer coopera­
tion. 
In addition to these two amendments, the 
Commission is proposing that in future the 
Treaty should allow increased cooperation in 
the field of common foreign and security pol­
icy. The minimum number of Member States 
should be fixed at one third of all Member 
States and the basic conditions governing such 
cooperation should be defined without preju­
dice to the integration already achieved in this 
area. 
Ill ItllHHMUIffllfUWraraWWWÌ 
Commission proposals to the conference: 
■ Member States should no longer be able to refer authorisation to establish closer coopera­
tion to the European Council for a unanimous decision (deletion of the second subparagraph 
of Article 11 (2) of the EC Treaty and of the second subparagraph of Article 40(2) of the Treaty 
on European Union); 
■ fix the minimum number at one third of Member States needed to establish closer 
cooperation under the Treaty; 
■ it should be possible in certain circumstances to establish closer cooperation In the field of 
common foreign and security policy. 
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Conclusion 
The Union must improve the way it works. It 
must equip itself to take up the challenge of 
enlargement. By embarking on genuine in-
depth reform of its institutions, it has to 
demonstrate that it has the political will to face 
up to the responsibilities which it intends to 
take on in opening its doors to new Member 
States. 
The new commitments recently entered into 
with the applicant countries impose the need 
for a deep-seated and durable adaptation of 
the Union's institutional architecture. 
The institutional structure that will emerge 
both from this intergovernmental conference 
and from current work on the review of the 
way the institutions operate must be strong 
enough to avert the risk of paralysis of Com-
munity activity and at the same time flexible 
enough to allow continued progress towards 
our goal of European integration. What the 
conference decides will set the framework for 
the political Europe of tomorrow. 
The Commission will fight the dangerous illu-
sion that major institutional reforms can wait 
for a subsequent conference. A second confer-
ence would risk delaying the enlargement 
which the reform is to prepare for. 
The plan is to conclude this conference at the 
end of 2000. It cannot allow itself to conclude 
with unanswered questions. We have a duty to 
achieve results: the Union's credibility depends 
on this. That duty is also incumbent on us 
because of the hopes that our citizens are pla-
cing in this European area of peace and soli-
darity that they wish to share and understand 
better. The reform, which the conference will 
decide on, must be an opportunity for real dialo-
gue with the people. 
The European institutions, and above all the 
Member States, should engage in this dialo-
gue. The Commission will devote all the 
resources it can to launching a genuine debate 
on institutional reform and the future of 
Europe. 
The Helsinki European Council determined 
ground rules for involving the European Par-
liament closely and concretely in the proceed-
ings of this conference. It is the Commission's 
wish that consultations with Parliament's 
President and Members should be as open and 
as constructive as possible throughout the 
negotiations. It will welcome the proposals 
made by Parliament in this cooperative and 
open-minded spirit. 
In the same spirit, the Commission will play its 
part in the necessary process of explanation and 
dialogue with the national parliaments. 
The chief purpose of the reform that is being 
launched is to strengthen the structures of an 
enlarged Europe. There will be regular 
exchanges of views with the applicant countries 
in existing forums, as agreed at the Helsinki 
European Council. The member countries of 
the European Economic Area will also be 
briefed on the progress of negotiations. 
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Draft articles 
EC Treaty articles 
The European Parliament 189, 190 
The Commission 215, 213, 217, 219 
The Court of Auditors 247 
The Economic and Social Committee 257, 258, 259, 262 
The Committee of the Regions 263 
Decision-making procedures 37, 67, 133, 300 
Closer cooperation 43 (TEU), 40 (TEU), 11 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Current text of EC Treaty 
Article 189 
The European Parliament, which shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the States brought 
together in the Community, shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty. 
The number of Members of the European Parliament shall not exceed 700. 
Article 190 
1. The representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples of the States brought together in 
the Community shall be elected by direct universal suffrage. 































In the event of amendments to this paragraph, the number of representatives elected in each 
Member State must ensure appropriate representation of the peoples of the States brought together 
in the Community. 
3'to 5. (...) 
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THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Draft amendment 
Article 189 
The European Parliament, which shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the States brought 
together in the Community, shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty. 
The number of Members of the European Parliament shall not exceed 700. 
Article 190 
1. The representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples of the States brought together in 
the Community shall be elected by direct universal suffrage. 
2. The European Parliament shall consist of: 
(a) (...) representatives elected on lists presented for the entire territory of the Community; 




In the event of amendments to this paragraph, the number of representatives elected in each 
Member State must ensure appropriate representation of the peoples of the States brought together 
in the Community. 
3 to 5. (...) 
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THE COMMISSION 
Current text of EC Treaty 
Article 215 
Apart from normal replacement, or death, the duties of a Member of the Commission shall end 
when he resigns or is compulsorily retired. 
The vacancy thus caused shall be filled for the remainder of the Member's term of office by a new 
Member appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States. The Council may, 
acting unanimously, decide that such a vacancy need not be filled. 
In the event of resignation, compulsory retirement or death, the President shall be replaced for the 
remainder of his term of office. The procedure laid down in Article 214(2) shall be applicable for the 
replacement of the President. 
Save in the case of compulsory retirement under Article 216, Members of the Commission shall 
remain in office until they have been replaced. 
Membership of the Commission — Option 1 
Current text of EC Treaty 
Article 213 
1. The Commission shall consist of 20 Members, who shall be chosen on the grounds of their 
general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt. 
The number of Members of the Commission may be altered by the Council, acting unanimously. 
Only nationals of Member States may be Members of the Commission. 
The Commission must include at least one national of each of the Member States, but may not 
include more than two Members having the nationality of the same State. 
2- (...) 




A Member of the Commission shall resign if asked to do so by the President. Apart from normal repla-
cement or death, the duties of a Member of the Commission shall end when he resigns, voluntarily 
or at the request of the President or when compulsorily retired. 
The vacancy thus caused shall be filled for the remainder of the Member's term of office by a new 
Member. This new Member, nominated by common accord by the President and the governments of the 
Member States, shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States. 
The Council may, acting unanimously, decide that such a vacancy need not be filled. 
In the event of resignation, compulsory retirement or death, the President shall be replaced for the 
remainder of his term of office. The procedure laid down in Article 214(2) shall be applicable for the 
replacement of the President. 
Save in the case of resignation at the request of the President or in the case of compulsory retirement 
under Article 216, Members of the Commission shall remain in office until they have been replaced. 
Membership of the Commission — Option 1 
Draft amendment 
Article 213 
1. The Commission shall consist of 20 Members, who shall be chosen on the grounds of their 
general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt. 
(deleted) 
(deleted) 
The Commission shall consist of a national of each of the Member States in turn, in the following order 
of Member States: ... 
(If this list is amended on the occasion of future accessions, the order of the Member States will have 
to be established in such a way as to ensure a balanced membership both in geographical terms and in 
terms of the size of the Member States. 
2. (...) 
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Membership of the Commission — Option 2 
Current text of EC Treaty 
Article 213 
1. The Commission shall consist of 20 Members, who shall be chosen on the grounds of their 
general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt. 
The number of Members of the Commission may be altered by the Council, acting unanimously. 
Only nationals of Member States may be Members of the Commission. 
The Commission must include at least one national of each of the Member States, but may not 
include more than two Members having the nationality of the same State. 
2. (...) 
Article 217 
The Commission may appoint a Vice-President or two Vice-Presidents from among its Members. 
Article 219 
The Commission shall work under the political guidance of its President. 
The Commission shall act by a majority of the number of Members provided for in Article 213. 
A meeting of the Commission shall be valid only if the number of Members laid down in its Rules of 
Procedure is present. 
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Membership of the Commission — Option 2 
Draft amendment 
Article 213 
1. The Commission shall consist of a national of each of the Member States, who shall be chosen on 






The President shall determine the political orientations of the Commission. 
The President may appoint Vice-Presidents from among the Members of the Commission, with respon-
sibility for coordination and management of the Commission's activities in a specific area. 
The President may entrust to Members of the Commission, for the duration of their term of office or 
part thereof, specific tasks or missions, with administrative departments to support them if necessary. 
Article 219 
(deleted following reformulation of Article 217). 
The Commission shall act by a majority of the number of Members provided for in Article 213. 
Where votes are evenly divided, the President shall have a casting vote. 
A meeting of the Commission shall be valid only if the number of Members laid down in its Rules of 
Procedure is present. 
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THE COURT OF AUDITORS 
Current text of EC Treaty 
Article 247 
1. The Court of Auditors shall consist of 15 Members. 
2. The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be chosen from among persons who belong or have 
belonged in their respective countries to external audit bodies or who are especially qualified for this 
office. Their independence must be beyond doubt. 
3. The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be appointed for a term of six years by the Council, 
acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. 
The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be eligible for reappointment. 
They shall elect the President of the Court of Auditors from among their number for a term of three 
years. The President may be re-elected. 
4 to 9. (...) 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
Current text of EC Treaty 
Article 257 
An Economic and Social Committee is hereby established. It shall have advisory status. 
The Committee shall consist of representatives of the various categories of economic and social 
activity, in particular, representatives of producers, farmers, carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, 
professional occupations and representatives of the general public. 
Article 258 
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THE COURT OF AUDITORS 
Draft amendment 
Article 247 
1. The Court of Auditors shall consist of 12 members. 
2. The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be chosen from among persons who belong or have 
belonged in their respective countries to external audit bodies or who are especially qualified for this 
office. Their independence must be beyond doubt. 
3. The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be appointed for a term of six years by the Council, 
acting by qualified majority (') after consulting the European Parliament. 
Members shall be eligible for reappointment every three years. There shall be a partial replacement of 
the Members. 
They shall elect the President of the Court of Auditors from among their number for a term of three 
years. The President may be re-elected. 
4 to 9. (...) 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
Draft amendment 
Article 257 
An Economic and Social Committee is hereby established. It shall have advisory status. 
The Committee shall consist of representatives of the various categories of civil society. 
Article 258 
The Economic and Social Committee shall consist of (...) members. 
(deletion of distribution by Member State) 
(') Consequence of qualified-majority voting becoming the general rule. 
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The members of the Committee shall be appointed by the Council, acting unanimously, for four 
years. Their appointments shall be renewable. 
The members of the Committee may not be bound by any mandatory instructions. They shall be 
completely independent in the performance of their duties, in the general interest of the Community. 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall determine the allowances of members of the 
Committee. 
Article 259 
1. For the appointment of the members of the Committee, each Member State shall provide the 
Council with a list containing twice as many candidates as there are seats allotted to its nationals. 
The composition of the Committee shall take account of the need to ensure adequate representation 
of the various categories of economic and social activity. 
2. The Council shall consult the Commission. It may obtain the opinion of European bodies which 
are representative of the various economic and social sectors to which the activities of the Commu-
nity are of concern. 
Article 262 
The Committee must be consulted by the Council or by the Commission where this Treaty so pro-
vides. The Committee may be consulted by these institutions in all cases in which they consider it 
appropriate. It may issue an opinion on its own initiative in cases in which it considers such action 
appropriate. 
The Council or the Commission shall, if it considers it necessary, set the Committee, for the submis-
sion of its opinion, a time-limit which may not be less than one month from the date on which the 
chairman receives notification to this effect. Upon expiry of the time-limit, the absence of an opinion 
shall not prevent further action. 
The opinion of the Committee and that of the specialised section, together with a record of the 
proceedings, shall be forwarded to the Council and to the Commission. 
The Committee may be consulted by the European Parliament. 
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The members of the Committee shall be appointed by the Council, acting by qualified majority ('). 
Their appointments shall be renewable. 
The members of the Committee may not be bound by any mandatory instructions. They shall be 
completely independent in the performance of their duties, in the general interest of the Community. 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall determine the allowances of members of the 
Committee. 
Article 259 
The Member States and organisations representing civil society at the European level may present can-
didates for membership of the Committee. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission after consulting the European Parliament, shall determine detailed rules for 
the designation of members of the Committee. 
The Council, after consulting the Commission, shall appoint the members of the Committee, taking 
account of the need to ensure adequate representation of the various categories of civil society 
and to ensure geographical balance. 
Article 262 
The Committee shall give its opinion on a legislative proposal from the Commission or on any other 
question where it considers such action appropriate (2). The Committee may also be consulted by the 
European Parliament, the Council or by the Commission. 
The European Parliament, the Council or the Commission shall, if it considers it necessary, set the 
Committee, for the submission of its opinion, a time-limit which may not be less than one month 
from the date on which the chairman receives notification to this effect. Upon expiry of the time-
limit, the absence of an opinion shall not prevent further action. 
The opinion of the Committee and that of the specialised section, together with a record of the pro-
ceedings, shall be forwarded to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission. 
(deleted) 
(') Consequence of qualified-majority voting becoming the general rule. 
P) The Treaty provisions providing for mandatory consultation will have to be adapted. 
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THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
Current text of EC Treaty 
Article 263 
A committee consisting of representatives of regional and local bodies, hereinafter referred to as 
'the Committee of the Regions', and is hereby established with advisory status. 















United Kingdom 24 
The members of the Committee and an equal number of alternate members shall be appointed for 
four years by the Council acting unanimously on proposals from the respective Member States. 
Their term of office shall be renewable. No member of the Committee shall at the same time be a 
Member of the European Parliament. 
The members of the Committee may not be bound by any mandatory instructions. They shall be 
completely independent in the performance of their duties, in the general interest of the Community. 
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THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
Draft amendment 
Article 263 
A committee consisting of representatives of regional and local bodies, hereinafter referred to as 
'the Committee of the Regions', and is hereby established with advisory status. 
The number of members of the Committee provided for in respect of each Member State shall be one 
third of the number of representatives elected to the European Parliament in each Member State, 
rounded up to the next whole number where necessary. 
The members of the Committee and an equal number of alternate members shall be appointed for 
four years by the Council acting by a qualified majority (') on proposals from the respective Member 
States. Their term of office shall be renewable. No member of the Committee shall at the same time 
be a Member of the European Parliament. 
The members of the Committee may not be bound by any mandatory instructions. They shall be 
completely independent in the performance of their duties, in the general interest of Community. 
(!) Consequence of qualified majority voting becoming the general rule. 
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DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES 




On a proposal from the Commission and after consultation of the European Parliament, the Council 
acting by qualified-majority voting make regulations, issue directives, or take decisions, without 




1. During a transitional period of five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amster-
dam, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission or on the initiative of a 
Member State and after consulting the European Parliament. 
2. After this period of five years: 
— the Council shall act on proposals from the Commission; the Commission shall examine any 
request made by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council; 
— the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, shall take a decision 
with a view to providing for all or parts of the areas covered by this title to be governed by the 
procedure referred to in Article 251 and adapting the provisions relating to the powers of the 
Court of Justice. 
3. By derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, measures referred to in Article 62(2)(b) (i) and (iii) shall, 
from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, be adopted by the Council acting by a qua-
lified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
4. By derogation from paragraph 2, measures referred to in Article 62(2)(b) (ii) and (iv) shall, after a 
period of five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, be adopted by the 
Council acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251. 






The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, adopt the 
measures of a fundamental nature relating to: 
(a) any common market organisation; 
(b) the application of the provisions of the chapter relating to rules on competition, to production of 
and trade in agricultural products; 
(c) the setting up of one or more guidance and guarantee funds; 
(d) veterinary and phytosanitary fields, protection of animal welfare, animal feed and seeds; 
(e) rural development in the agricultural sector and structural actions in the fisheries sector; 
(0 the quality of agricultural products; 
(g) the Community rules for fisheries and aquaculture. 
Measures which are of general political importance for the conception and orientation of the common 
agricultural policy or common fisheries policy and have important budgetary implications shall be 
deemed to be of a fundamental nature. 




1. During a transitional period of five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amster-
dam, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission or on the initiative of a 
Member State and after consulting the European Parliament. 
2. After this period of five years: 
— the Council shall act in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251; 
— the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, shall take a decision 
with a view to ... adapting the provisions relating to the powers of the Court of Justice. 
3. By derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, measures referred to in Article 62(2)(b) (i) and (iii) shall, 
from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, be adopted by the Council acting by a qua-
lified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
(deleted) 
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Artide 133 
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to 
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity 
in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken 
in the event of dumping or subsidies. 
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commer-
cial policy. 
3. Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, 
the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission 
to open the necessary negotiations. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee 
appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such 
directives as the Council may issue to it. 
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply. 
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this article, the Council shall act by a qualified 
majority. 
5. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations 





3. The Council shall conclude agreements after consulting the European Parliament, except for the 
agreements referred to in Article 133(3), including cases where the agreement covers a field for which 
the procedure referred to in Article 251 or that referred to in Article 252 is required for the adoption 
of internal rules. The European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a time-limit which the 
Council may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. In the absence of an opinion within 
that time-limit, the Council may act. 
(...) 
4 to 7. (...) 
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Artide 133 
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to 
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and 
services, investment and intellectual property, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberal-
isation, export policy and rights to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping 
or subsidies. 
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commer-
cial policy. 
3. Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, 
the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission 
to open the necessary negotiations. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee 
appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such 
directives as the Council may issue to it. The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parlia-
ment of the conduct of such negotiations. 
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply. 
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified 
majority. The procedure referred to in Article 251 shall apply to the adoption of instruments of general 





3. The Council shall conclude agreements after consulting the European Parliament, ... including 
cases where the agreement covers a field for which the procedure referred to in Article 251 or that 
referred to in Article 252 is required for the adoption of internal rules. The European Parliament 
shall deliver its opinion within a time-limit which the Council may lay down according to the 
urgency of the matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time limit, the Council may act. 
(...) 
4 to 7. (...) 
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CLOSER COOPERATION 
Current text of Treaties 
Article 43 of the TEU 
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may make use of 
the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by this Treaty and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community provided that the cooperation: 
(a) is aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and at protecting and serving its interests; 
(b) respects the principles of the said Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union; 
(c) is only used as a last resort, where the objectives of the said Treaties could not be attained by 
applying the relevant procedures laid down therein; 
(d) concerns at least a majority of Member States; 
(e) does not affect the acquis communautaire and the measures adopted under the other provisions of 
the said Treaties; 
(f) does not affect the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those Member States which 
do not participate therein; 
(g) is open to all Member States and allows them to become parties to the cooperation at any time, 
provided that they comply with the basic decision and with the decisions taken within that frame-
work; 
(h) complies with the specific additional criteria laid down in Article 11 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and Article 40 of this Treaty, depending on the area concerned, and is 
authorised by the Council in accordance with the procedures laid down therein. 
2. (...) 
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CLOSER COOPERATION 
Draft amendment 
Article 43 of the TEU 
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may make use of 
the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by this Treaty and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community provided that the cooperation: 
(a) is aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and at protecting and serving its interests; 
(b) respects the principles of the said Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union; 
(c) is only used as a last resort, where the objectives of the said Treaties could not be attained by 
applying the relevant procedures laid down therein; 
(d) concerns at least one third of Member States; 
(e) does not affect the acquis communautaire and the measures adopted under the other provisions of 
the said Treaties; 
(f) does not affect the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those Member States which 
do not participate therein; 
(g) is open to all Member States and allows them to become parties to the cooperation at any time, 
provided that they comply with the basic decision and with the decisions taken within that frame-
work; 
(h) complies with the specific additional criteria laid down in Article 11 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and Article 40 of this Treaty, depending on the area concerned, and is 
authorised by the Council in accordance with the procedures laid down therein ('). 
2. (...) 
(!) A new article will have to be envisaged to authorise closer cooperation in the common foreign and security policy and to determine 
the conditions applicable to it. 
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Artide 40 of the TEU 
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may be 
authorised, subject to Articles 43 and 44, to make use of the institutions, procedures and mechan-
isms laid down by the Treaties provided that the cooperation proposed: 
(a) respects the powers of the European Community, and the objectives laid down by this title; 
(b) has the aim of enabling the Union to develop more rapidly into an area of freedom, security and 
justice. 
2. The authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority at the request of the Member States concerned and after inviting the Commission to pre-
sent its opinion; the request shall also be forwarded to the European Parliament. 
If a Member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it 
intends to oppose the granting of an authorisation by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. 
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European 
Council for decision by unanimity. 
(...) 
3 to 5. (...) 
Article 11 of the EC Treaty 
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may be 
authorised, subject to Articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty on European Union, to make use of the insti-
tutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by this Treaty, provided that the cooperation pro-
posed: 
(a) does not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the Community; 
(b) does not affect Community policies, actions or programmes; 
(c) does not concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between nationals of Member 
States; 
(d) remains within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community by this Treaty; and 
(e) does not constitute a discrimination or a restriction of trade between Member States and does 
not distort the conditions of competition between the latter. 
2. The authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
If a Member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it 
intends to oppose the granting of an authorisation by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. 
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the Council, 
meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government, for decision by unanimity. 
(...) 
3 to 5. (...) 
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Artide 40 of the TEU 
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may be 
authorised, subject to Articles 43 and 44, to make use of the institutions, procedures and mechan-
isms laid down by the Treaties provided that the cooperation proposed: 
(a) respects the powers of the European Community, and the objectives laid down by this title; 
(b) has the aim of enabling the Union to develop more rapidly into an area of freedom, security and 
justice. 
2. The authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority at the request of the Member States concerned and after inviting the Commission to pre-
sent its opinion; the request shall also be forwarded to the European Parliament. 
(deleted) 
(...) 
3 to 5. (...) 
Artide 11 of the EC Treaty 
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may be 
authorised, subject to Articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty on European Union, to make use of the insti-
tutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by this Treaty, provided that the cooperation pro-
posed: 
(a) does not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the Community; 
(b) does not affect Community policies, actions or programmes; 
(c) does not concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between nationals of Member 
States; 
(d) remains within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community by this Treaty; and 
(e) does not constitute a discrimination or a restriction of trade between Member States and does 
not distort the conditions of competition between the latter. 
2. The authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
(deleted) 
(...) 
3 to 5. (...) 
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Annex 1 
List of provisions on which unanimous votes would 
continue to be taken, by way of derogation from the 
principle of qualified-majority voting 
1. Council decisions which have to be adopted by the Member States in accordance with their 
constitutional requirements 
— Additional rights for European citizens (Article 22 of the EC Treaty) 
— Uniform procedure for elections to the European Parliament (Article 190(4) of the EC 
Treaty) 
— Provisions relating to the own resources system (Article 269 of the EC Treaty) 
2. Essential institutional decisions and those affecting the institutional balance (') 
— Adapting the provisions relating to the powers of the court in the area of freedom, security 
and justice (Article 67(2) of the EC Treaty) 
— Measures and Community financial assistance in the event of severe difficulties (Article 
100(1) and part of (2) of the EC Treaty) 
— Provisions replacing the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure (Article 104(14) of 
the EC Treaty) 
— Amending the Statute of the ESCB (Article 107(5) of the EC Treaty) 
— Setting the rate at which the euro is substituted for a national currency (Article 123(5) of 
the EC Treaty) 
— Laying down the principles and rules governing the conferring of implementing powers 
(Article 202 of the EC Treaty) 
— Increasing the number of members of the Court of Justice and of Advocates-General 
(Articles 221 and 222 of the EC Treaty) (2) 
— Composition of the Court of First Instance (Article 225(2) of the EC Treaty) (2) 
— Determining the classes of action or proceeding to be heard by the Court of First Instance 
(Article 225(2) of the EC Treaty) 
— Amending Title III of the Statute of the Court of Justice (second paragraph, Article 245 of 
the EC Treaty) (2) 
— Approving the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance 
(third paragraph, Article 245 and Article 225(4) of the EC Treaty) (2) 
— The languages of the institutions (Article 290 of the EC Treaty) 
— Taking of measures to attain one of the objectives of the Community where the Treaty has 
not provided the necessary powers (Article 308 of the EC Treaty) 
(') Decisions on changing the number of Members of the Commission (Article 231(1) EC) and on not replacing a Member of the 
Commission (second paragraph of Article 215 EC) will have to be reviewed in the light of the rules governing the composition 
of the Commission. 
(2) The eventual application of qualified-majority voting for provisions relating to the composition of the Court of Justice (Articles 
221, 222 and 225 (2) EC amending Title 111 of the Statute of the Court and approving the rules of procedure of the Court of First 
Instance (Articles 245 and 225 (4) will be re-examined in the eventual contribution of the Commission on the Court of Justice. 
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Decisions in fields of taxation and social security not related to the proper functioning of the 
internal market 
— Harmonisation of legislation concerning certain forms of taxation (redrafting of Articles 93 
and 95 of the EC Treaty) 
— Harmonisation of legislation for social security (redrafting of first indent of Article 137(3) 
of the EC Treaty) 
Parallel internal and external decisions 
— Agreements on the exchange rates of the euro against foreign currencies (Article 111(1) of 
the EC Treaty) 
— Association of overseas countries and territories (Article 187 of the EC Treaty) 
— Conclusion of agreements requiring internal unanimity (Article 300(2) of the EC Treaty) 
— Association agreements (Articles 300(2) and 310 of the EC Treaty) 
Derogations from the common rules of the Treaty 
— Introduction of restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and non-
member countries (Article 57(2) of the EC Treaty) 
— Derogation from the standstill clause in relation to transport (Article 72 of the EC Treaty) 
— Compatibility of aid with the common market (Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty) 
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Annex 2 
Effects of applying the principle of qualified-majority voting 
The legal bases in respect of which the Council would henceforth take decisions by qualified majority 
A. Legislative measures (to be decided on by the co-decision procedure) (') 
— Measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc. (Article 13 of the EC 
Treaty) 
— Facilitation of the exercise of the rights to move and reside freely (Article 18 of the EC 
Treaty), already a co-decision matter 
— Coordination of the legislation on social security for workers (Article 42 of the EC Treaty), 
already a co-decision matter (2) 
— Taking up and pursuing activities as self-employed persons, amending the existing 
legislative principles (Article 47(2) of the EC Treaty), already a co-decision matter 
— Measures to establish the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 67 of the EC Treaty), 
redrafting of the article so that, after the transitional period of five years, the co-decision 
procedure will automatically apply to general legislative rules in all the areas of Title IV 
— Principles of the regulatory system for transport which would be liable to have an effect on 
the standard of living in certain areas, operation of facilities (Article 71(2) of the EC Treaty) 
— Measures in the social policy field (Articles 137(3) and 139(2) of the EC Treaty), unless the 
provisions relating to social security are redrafted 
— Certain environment policy provisions (Article 175(2) of the EC Treaty) 
— Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund (Article 161 of the EC Treaty) and other specific 
actions to bring about economic and social cohesion (third paragraph, Article 159 of the 
EC Treaty) 
— Financial regulation (Article 279 of the EC Treaty) 
B. Other measures 
— Extension of the application of the common commercial policy to all services, to invest-
ments and to intellectual property rights (Article 133 of the EC Treaty), redrafting of 
the article so that qualified majority voting will apply directly to these fields and so that co-
decision will apply to general unilateral rules of a legislative nature in the field of commercial 
policy 
— Culture (Article 151 of the EC Treaty) already a co-decision matter 
— Industrial policy (Article 157 of the EC Treaty) 
— Arms, munitions and war material (Article 296 of the EC Treaty) 
(') Article 94 of the EC Treaty can be removed when the articles on taxation have been redrafted, as it is no longer used for anything 
except tax harmonisation (the two other exceptions to the application of Article 95 of the EC Treaty referred to in the second 
paragraph of Article 94, the free movement of persons and workers' rights and interests, are governed by other Treaty provisions). 
(2) This provision should be redrafted to cover not only all migrant workers but all European citizens who exercise their right to move 
and reside freely within the Union. 
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C. Institutional provisions 
— Right to vote in elections to the European Parliament and municipal elections (Article 19 of 
the EC Treaty) 
— Conferring on the ECB specific tasks relating to prudential supervision (Article 105(6) of 
the EC Treaty) 
— External representation in the context of EMU (Article 111(4) of the EC Treaty) 
— Measures required for the introduction of the euro (Article 123(4) of the EC Treaty) 
— Assigning to the Commission tasks in connection with social policy (Article 144 of the 
EC Treaty) 
— Approval of the regulations governing the performance of their duties by Members of the 
European Parliament (Article 190(5) of the EC Treaty) 
— Laying down the order in which the office of President of the Council is held (Article 203 of 
the EC Treaty) 
— Appointment of the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the Council 
(Article 207(2) of the EC Treaty) 
— Appointment of members of the Court of Auditors (Article 247(3) of the EC Treaty) 
— Appointment of members of the Economic and Social Committee (Article 258 of the 
EC Treaty) 
— Appointment of members of the Committee of the Regions (Article 263 of the EC Treaty) 
D. Provisions which will require partial redrafting to distinguish between matters decided by qualified 
majority and those which will still be decided by unanimous vote 
— Harmonisation of legislation on certain forms of taxation (redrafting of Articles 93 and 95 
of the EC Treaty) 
— Measures in the social security field (redrafting of the first indent of Article 137(3) of the 
EC Treaty) 
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Annex 3 
Extrapolation of the present system on the composition of 
the European Parliament and the Commission and for the 




























































































































































































Based on Eurostat figures for 1999, except for Malta (1998) and Turkey (national figures — IMF). Estimate: Germany, United Kingdom and 
Turkey. Provisional: France and Ireland. 
NB: 
1. This table is only for illustrative purposes. It in no way commits the Commission. 
2. For the purpose of clarification, it should be noted that the current population figures are different to those at the time of the decision on the 
number of seats in the European Parliament and the number of votes in the Council. 
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